Following is the text of the introduction and Mafia-related portions (through Page 47) of Organized Crime and Illicit Traffic in Narcotics, a 1965 U.S. government report. These sections outline the history of the American Mafia and its crime families across the United States, while providing the names and law enforcement agency file numbers of hundreds of crime family leaders and members. The report was authored by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate's Committee on Government Operations chaired by Senator John L. McClellan. It is based upon earlier hearings conducted by the subcommittee. (A PDF file containing Parts 1 through 5 of the hearing documents can be accessed through the National Criminal Justice Reference Service.) Pages in this web version have been numbered to correspond to the printed report. If errors are found on any of these pages, please contact us.
Report cover
March 4, 1965. - Ordered to be printed
44-253
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C., 20402 - Price $1.25
JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas, Chairman
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina
ERNEST GRUENING, Alaska
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut
FRED R. HARRIS, Oklahoma
ROBERT F. KENNEDY, New York
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
MILWARD L. SIMPSON, Wyoming
Walter L. Reynolds, Chief Clerk
JOHN L. McCLELLAN, Arkansas, Chairman
HENRY M. JACKSON, Washington
SAM J. ERVIN, Jr., North Carolina
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine
ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, Connecticut
FRED R. HARRIS, Oklahoma
KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota
CARL T. CURTIS, Nebraska
JACOB K. JAVITS, New York
Jerome S. Adlerman, General Counsel
Donald F. O'Donnell, Chief Counsel
Philip W. Morgan, Chief Counsel to the Minority
Ruth Young Watt, Chief Clerk
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PART 1
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MARCH 4, 1965. - Ordered to be printed
Mr. McClellan, from the Committee on Government Operations, submitted the following
The subcommittee's hearings on organized crime, held during the autumn of 1963, and its subsequent hearings on the illicit traffic in narcotics during 1964, developed new and detailed information concerning organized crime. The hearings have been described by witnesses expert in the field as the first major breakthrough in the barrier of silence that has traditionally surrounded and protected the hierarchy of the underworld, particularly in the Mafia, the criminal organization that is also known as Cosa Nostra. The hearings were conducted with the cooperation of: the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, and police departments from several metropolitan areas, and they were held pursuant to the subcommittee's authority under Senate Resolutions 17 and 278 of the 88th Congress.
The focal witness of the organized crime hearings, Joseph Valachi, had been a member of the secret criminal conspiracy for three decades. His testimony was the first public exposure of the intricate structure and the detailed operations of the organization that he called "Cosa Nostra," which translates colloquially as "Our Thing" or "Our Fam- ily." His testimony showed that the organization he described, in its characteristics and attributes and membership, is the same criminal group that many law enforcement agencies have known familiarly for decades as the Mafia, or "the Organization," or "the Outfit," or "the Syndicate."
This report of the subcommittee reviews the significance of the testimony in terms of the wealth of criminal intelligence that it has furnished to men who fight organized crime: it reveals the nature and
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characteristics of the criminal enemy as seen through the eyes of an insider who sought to destroy the organization in which he had served for 30 years; it examines the detailed corroboration of his testimony offered by experienced police officials from several metropolitan areas; it discusses aspects of the crime problem in which legislation may be needed to curb the corruption and criminality of well-organized gangsters. The frequent identification of major criminals, and the attribution to them of widespread and long-continued criminal acts, has never sufficed to crush their conspiracies nor to eliminate permanently their principal clandestine activities. The crime leaders are experienced, resourceful, and shrewd in evading and dissipating the effects of established procedures in law enforcement. Their operating methods, carefully and cleverly evolved during several decades of this century, generally are highly effective foils against diligent police efforts to obtain firm evidence that would lead to prosecution and conviction.
The crime chieftains, for example, have developed the process of "insulation" to a remarkable degree. The efficient police forces in a particular area may well be aware that a crime leader has ordered a murder, or is an important trafficker in narcotics, or controls an illegal gambling network, or extorts usurious earns from "shylocking" ventures. Convicting him of his crimes, however, is usually extremely difficult and sometimes is impossible, simply because the top-ranking criminal has taken the utmost care to insulate himself from any apparent physical connection with the crime or with his hireling who commits it. Criminal intelligence is, therefore, of primary importance to law enforcement agencies in fighting organized crime, which has been shown to be a big business in the United States with an annual income of many billions of dollars.
This report also is largely concerned with review of the testimony offered during the subcommittee's hearings in 1964 on illicit traffic in narcotics, a criminal field that was shown to be inextricably involved with the organized crime conspiracy. The examination of narcotics trafficking covers the entire network of crime in this field, from identification and description of the international sources of illicit drugs, through their foreign processing and shipment, to their ultimate distribution to drug addicts in the United States, The report then discusses the enforcement regulations and procedures in the narcotics field, the problems caused by the powerful influences of organized crime in the traffic, and it also discusses in detail the various programs for treatment and rehabilitation of addicts that are now in operation here and abroad, as well as certain innovations and experiments that have been proposed by concerned authorities.
The subcommittee wishes to emphasize the testimony of New York Police Commissioner Michael J. Murphy, who pointed out that crimes are committed by individuals, not by racial or ethnic groups. Since this series of hearings on organized crime and illicit traffic In narcotics was focused primarily upon the activities of the Mafia, the subcommittee points out that the stern code of that organization limits membership exclusively to men of Italian nativity or parentage.
The criminal element among Americans of Italian nativity or parentage is a minute percentage of the millions of citizens of this country who have Italian backgrounds. The Mafia is certainly not representa-
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tive of the Italian heritage in America. On the contrary, the achievements of Italian-Americans in our society in such fields as law, medicine, government, science, education, and business, to specify only a few, form an outstanding record. Several of the expert and informative witnesses in the subcommittee's hearings were police officials of Italian ancestry who have devoted many years to fighting organized crime. Public indignation about the depredations of the Mafia should be directed at the Mafia leaders and their underlings who prey upon the public. It should also be remembered that the Mafia, with its roots in the island of Sicily, is regarded as a major criminal element by the Italian Government and is the target of continuing police efforts.
This report contains the findings and conclusions of the subcommittee which resulted from the hearings, and it makes recommendations that the subcommittee trusts will serve as basic proposals to furnish the kind of legislative weapons that the Nation needs to win the war on organized crime.
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Intelligence results of Joseph Valachi's testimony
During his appearance before the subcommittee, Joseph Valachi gave a clear and detailed profile of the criminal organization of which he was a member for three decades. He testified particularly about Metropolitan New York, but he also described the confederation's network in other American cities insofar as his admittedly regional knowledge permitted him to do so. His testimony about the Mafia (called Cosa Nostra by its members) shows how today's smooth-working and experienced combine evolved from the gang wars and the power struggles of the early 1930's.
His testimony was verified and substantiated in large measure by witnesses from law enforcement agencies who are experts on organized crime. They added essentials of which he personally could have no knowledge, and they backed up his picture of the organized underworld with local and Federal records and with the accumulated data furnished by other informants.
Former Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy appeared as a witness, describing the criminal organization as a private government of crime that handles billions of dollars in annual income that is derived from human suffering and moral corrosion.
The Attorney General testified that Federal investigative agencies now are certain, because of intelligence gathered from Joseph Valachi and other informants, that the national crime syndicate is operated by a commission of top-ranking criminals, varying in number from 9 to 12 members, and that their identities are known. This commission makes policy decisions for the combine, settles disputes among the various factions or "families," and allocates territories for each family's operations.
As an indication that Valachi's estimates of membership make a good foundation for criminal intelligence work, the testimony of the Attorney General is cited: "Federal investigative agencies are now pooling information on more than 1,100 major racketeers" (p. 6).
The importance of Joseph Valachi's testimony as a police intelligence weapon is exemplified in the work of the New York City Police Department in the period immediately prior to the subcommittee's hearings, when the Valachi information was made available to the Central Investigation Bureau, the intelligence unit of the department.
Until that time, almost all of the murders in the gang war and in the Cosa Nostra power struggle that followed it had been carried for almost 30 years as active cases by the New York police. Using the Valachi account as a guide, the intelligence unit searched the department's files, in a precinct-by-precinct operation, checking scattered and uncoordinated facts against the information furnished by the witness. Sgt. Ralph Salerno, of the New York City Police, regarded
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as an expert on organized crime, testified to the results. In each case, Sergeant Salerno verified from police records the specific details of Valachi's accounts of the gang slayings, including dates, locations, and circumstances.
Mr. Kennedy emphasized, in a pointed summary, the vital importance of the identification of Mafia families and their leaders in his testimony that initiated this series of hearings:
* * * This is one reason the disclosures made by Joseph Valachi are of such significance: For the first time, an insider - a knowledgeable member of the racketeering hierarchy - has broken the underworld's code of silence.
Valachi's disclosures are more important, however, for another reason. In working a jigsaw puzzle, each piece in place tells us something about the whole picture and enables us to see additional relationships (p. 6).
In Mr. Kennedy's phrasing, this report is intended to work on the jigsaw puzzle - to add the essential detail and bring the picture into sharper focus, because the appearance of organized crime is very deceptive to the casual eye.
The taproots of the criminal organization known as the Mafia lie deep in the troubled history of the island of Sicily, which was overrun by invaders and conquerors for almost 2,000 years. The precise origins and development of the secret criminal society on the island are uncertain, but it is probable that the Mafia came into being to fight the excesses of absentee feudal landlords in their harsh treatment of the peasantry on the island. Historians who have traced the growth of the organization from medieval times into the modern era are generally agreed that the Mafia was conceived in rebellion against Sicily's conquerors. In modern times, the Sicilian Mafia has almost entirely lost its ancient aura of revolutionary and patriotic lawlessness and has become primarily a criminal combine specializing in fraud and extortion, among other crimes. The modern Mafia in Sicily, although it no longer has any vestige of the Robin Hood legend, still relies upon the code and traditions and methods of operation of the ancient secret society. These characteristics are also common to the Mafia in the United States in the 1960's, having been brought here and maintained by Sicilian immigrants at the turn of the century. The basic organizational pattern and its policies of terrorism and violence have been retained by the American combine, which has continued to maintain a close mutual understanding with the Sicilian group.
Much of Joseph Valachi's testimony was devoted to tracing for the subcommittee the hierarchy of the American Mafia. He testified that in the early 1930's the combine operated under an absolute ruler - "they used to have the boss of all bosses." He declared that the commission or council was instituted by Charles "Lucky" Luciano, and he described the quasi-military characteristics and nomenclature of the organization. The separate families had individual bosses, each of whom had an "underboss." There were separate groups within the families, and each group had a "caporegima which is a lieutenant." The men like himself, who served in the ranks, were called "soldiers" within the
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organization, but were often known as "button men" on the outside. He testified to the major change instituted by Luciano:
THE CHAIRMAN. You say now, however, there is a commission. Does it now have a boss of all bosses?
MR. VALACHI. No, no more boss over all bosses, they have what you call a concerti, a consigia. I will put it to you this way: Charlie Luciano put it into effect, a member of six, to protect soldiers, because if a lieutenant in the old days had it in for a soldier or he wanted to pick on the soldier, he could make up stories and to protect the soldier they formed what we call the consigio * * * (p.81).[1]
In the city of New York, the witness stated, the organization today consists of five families (see pp. 19-30 of this report). He named their leaders: Vito Genovese, presently a Federal prisoner on a narcotics conviction; Carlo Gambino; Giuseppe Magliocco, who died of natural causes on December 29, 1963; Joseph Bonnano, known to police and the underworld as "Joe Bananas" [supposedly the victim of kidnaping in October of 1964, on the eve of his appearance before a Federal grand jury]; and Gaetano Lucchese, whose chief alias is "Three-Finger Brown." These are the men who run Cosa Nostra and its network of organized crime in New York City. Theoretically, they are equal in status and in power, but Valachi testified colorfully that Vito Genovese, even while serving a sentence in the penitentiary, was a man of tremendous influence:
He also controls the power in the Gambino family and the Lucchese family. In other words, they eliminated the boss of all bosses, but Vito Genovese is a boss of all bosses under the table * * * (p. 88).
The witness also identified commission members, underbosses, lieutenants, and hundreds of soldiers who are members of the five Metropolitan New York families, as well as leaders and soldiers of families outside New York. For the first time jn the history of criminal intelligence, there were reliable indications of the tremendous size of the organization on a national scale.
Capt. William Duly, director of intelligence for the Chicago Police Department, quoted eight characteristics used by the Department of Justice to distinguish organized crime groups from other types of criminal bands. This testimony reached the heart of the matter; this report. shows that the Mafia fits neatly and snugly into the framework established by these eight characteristics:
1. A substantial number of members.
2. The group is aggressively engaged in attempts to subvert the process of government, by well-organized endeavors to capture or otherwise make ineffectual the three branches of our local and Federal Government by various forms of bribery and corruption.
[1] The language that Valachi used in his testimony was colorfully his own, reflecting a lifetime spent "on the streets," in prisons, and in the shadows of the underworld. His frequent use of criminal argot and his limited vocabulary often made his statements difficult to understand, particularly when they were lifted from the context of his testimony. For example, in referring to "a member of six" in the testimony quoted above, he meant that Luciano formed a council composed of six members. His testimony, although limited in its range of expression, usually represented an attempt to be direct and to stick to the point. The subcommittee, therefore, allowed him to tell his story in his own way, and sought to clarify his meaning by interrogation on obscure references.
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3. The primary purpose of this group is to dominate those categories of crime which we refer to as "organized crime." By "organized crime" I mean the following: gambling, illegal distribution of narcotics, commercialized prostitution, labor and management racketeering, loansharking, and the infiltration of the crime syndicate into legitimate enterprises.
4. The group anticipates a continuous, indefinite lifespan of operations.
5. Members habitually engage in similar criminal activity as a primary source of income.
6. Top leadership and management people primarily engage in crimes of conspiracy, and are usually divorced from operations by two or more levels.
7. The group is dedicated to commit murder and other acts of violence upon any member who informs on the group, and to commit similar violence on any outsider who seriously threatens the security of the group.
8. * * * the group does not recognize any geographical boundaries of operations and is often associated in crime with similar groups in other cities, States, and, in some instances, in other countries (p. 507).
Inspector John J. Shanley of the New York City Police Department gave the subcommittee an expert's analysis of the protective measures that have been adopted by Cosa Nostra leaders. His examination of Cosa Nostra's structure and operations (pp. 66-70) is Summarized as follows in terms of the 10 self-protecting measures used by its leadership. Each measure is accompanied by illustrative summaries or excerpts from witnesses' testimony:
1. Insulation. - Top-ranking members avoid involvement in actual crimes. They limit social contacts and eliminate all obvious links to criminal operations. The strongest insulation is Cosa Nostra's inherent philosophy that bosses must be protected. A combination of fear and traditional distaste for informing has helped preserve 30 years of silence, broken publicly only by Joseph Valachi.
Attorney General Kennedy. * * * if they want to have somebody knocked off, for instance, the top man will speak to somebody who will, speak to somebody else and order it * * * (p. 23).
Joseph Valachi testified (p. 351) that this pattern was followed exactly in his management of the murder of a certain Giannini on September 20, 1952. Charles Luciano sent word from Italy to Vito Genovese that Giannini was an informer; Genovese told Anthony (Tony Bender) Strollo to have Giannini murdered; Strollo told Valachi, who supervised the thugs who committed the murder.
2. Respect. - Deference is given to position, authority, and seniority, and is unmistakable when observed. Status is often revealed by the tone of voice, the held door, the proffered seat. "Sleepers" (high-ranking members whose importance was relatively unknown) have been revealed to police by displays of respect.
MR. SHANLEY. * * * There was one man wo knew but we never considered him to be of any particular high status * * * every time this man had occasion to walk over to the
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detective to be interrogated, everybody stood up and let him pass them * * * everybody jumped up and let him sit down.
* * * * *
* * * Tony Bender * * * was in a station house and this fellow was showing his disregard for the arrest * * * clowning around * * *.
Bender said * * * "Why don't you sit down, Frank." Frank sat down and never opened his mouth for the rest of the night (p. 74).
* * * * *
MR. VALACHI [Concerning Vito Genovese] * * * At this time right now I am losing respect for him, see * * * I had the highest, all through 30 years * * *, I even stuttered when I talked to him (p. 95).
3. The Buffer. - Leaders do not mix or deal with underlings, but use a trusted aid to stand between the boss and trouble. This buffer has many functions and knows all the boss' operations.
MR. SHANLEY. We have one here, Anthony Carillo, Tony the Sheik. He is a buffer in a sense for Mike Miranda. You observe Tony the Sheik. You are going to see Mike Miranda * * * he usually is in his company * * *
* * * * *
MR ADLERMAN. Do you find, for example, Vito Genovese or Jerry Catena or Mike Miranda * * * do they deal directly with the soldiers * * * ?
MR. SHANLEY. No; they do not * * *. Very few of these people are in operations. They are insulated against themselves (pp. 271-272). [Emphasis supplied.]
* * * * *
MR. VALACHI. * * * There are really many soldiers that never know the boss * * *. Soldiers are in there 10 years, probably, and never saw a boss (p. 91).
4. The appointment. - Infrequently, with utmost security a leader may meet an underling upon an urgent matter. Ordinarily, even the most important matters go through regular channels.
MR. VALACHI. * * * Now, if a soldier wants to talk to a boss, he should not take the privilege for him to try to go direct to the boss. We must speak first to the caporegima, and the caporegima, if it is required and it is important enough, the caporegima will make an appointment for the soldier * * * (p. 215).
5. The sitdown. - Meetings known as "sitdowns" are peace conferences within families or among allied families. Usually these are held at lower levels, although sometimes the heads of Cosa Nostra families must meet on vital questions. Decisions at the upper level are final.
MR. VALACHI. I was brought on the carpet [called to a hearing about a disciplinary infraction] * * * he was represented by his lieutenant, and I was represented by my lieutenant * * * which was Tony Bender * * * and also Albert Anastasia was there, which was his boss (pp. 186-187).
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After the shooting of Albert Anastasia there was a meeting [at Apalachin, N.Y.] * * * held for two main reasons that I know of. One was to talk about the justifying of the shooting of Albert Anastasia. The other one was that they were going to talk about eliminating some couple of hundred new members * * *. But they never reached to have this meeting and they never had a chance to tell it because they got arrested (p. 388).
6. Discipline. - Whenever necessary, as it frequently is, discipline is kept within a family and is carried out by associates. Punishment ranges from warnings to sanctions on crimimal enterprises to murder.
On the murder of Willie Moretti, who was supposedly talking too much because he was deranged:
MR. VALACHI. * * * Willie Moretti was killed and they expressed it that he was a sick man * * * he was supposed to be a mercy killing * * * (pp. 324-325).
On the consiglieri or commission:
MR. VALACHI. * * * a lieutenant wants to have a soldier killed or something like that in that line, he cannot do it no more * * * he must come up and talk to these six * * * (p. 236).
7. The disappearance. - When murder is decreed, trusted fellow members carry out the sentence, and the man vanishes without a trace - no violence, no gunplay, no blood, no body, no public outcry. The case is carried by police as a disappearance; the victim is a missing person. (Notable cases in recent years: Anthony (Tony Bender) Strollo, Vincent (Jimmy Jerome) Squillante, and Armand Rava.)
SERGEANT SALERNO. [On the disappearance of Armand Rava.] We don't truly have an official complaint, either that he is missing, by any member of his family who do reside in our city, nor do we have any complaints of homicide, nor is there a body * * * (p. 361).
* * * * *
MR. VALACHI. [On the disappearance of Tony Bender.] Vito Genovese told me that it was the best thing that could have happened to Tony * * *. And he said, "Well, you know he was a sick guy, and he won't be able to take it like you and I." Like he couldn't take time * * * time-in prison * * * It meant that in our language, that he had ordered his death (pp. 87-88).
8. Permission. - All illicit activities within a family require the approval of the boss. The family that gives permission will help if anything goes wrong. Family policy is the criterion; crimes which arouse the public are forbidden.
MR. VALACHI. * * * You are in serious trouble if you were arrested for narcotics * * * you have another trial after having a trial with the Government (p. 319).
* * * * *
[On Cosa Nostra's role when a member is in trouble or in prison.] In that case, they helped you all the way and they support your family while you are away. You get that if it
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is something that they ordered you to do. The money comes from dues (p. 240).
9. The money mover. - One or more trusted members handle much of the cash pouring into a family from its illegal sources. The money mover has commercial connections; he puts the profits to work while hiding their sources. He invests in importing, real estate, trust funds, stocks and bonds, and certain other favored enterprises. The bulk of the profits clandestinely go to the bosses.
MR. SHANLEY. * * * He has excellent and widespread connections. And he has as a partner an astute, unethical businessman. He and his partner merge two basic abilities: brains and brawn * * *, The object is to invest in legitimate situations, but anywhere a quick buck can be made without too much risk is not overlooked (p. 70).
10. Public relations. - The organization is always concerned with public opinion, and all strong actions which might influence the public must be cleared with the Cosa Nostra leaders. Failures in this area reflect upon the boss. The front of respectability and propriety must be maintained.
MR. SHANLEY. * * * They have considered various plans, the possibility of hiring public relations people (p. 71).
* * * * *
Attorney General KENNEDY. * * * The racketeer is not someone dressed in a black shirt, white tie, and diamond stickpin * * *. He is more likely to be outfitted in a gray flannel suit. * * * (p. 16).
The Attorney General stated that it is clear that organized crime is a national problem. The fact that the syndicate criminal is infrequently recognized by the public makes his power for evil even greater. Mr. Kennedy pointed out that the costs are not confined to the vast illicit profits of gambling and narcotics, but that the financial burdens are borne by the public when racketeers infiltrate legitimate business, they are borne by the public in the form of higher wages and higher prices because of labor racketeering, that corruption and bribery of public officials again exacts an incalculable price from the public.
The main problems of law enforcement agencies in dealing with organized crime were summarized (pp. 489ff.) by Chicago's Superintendent Wilson, in answer to a question: "What accounts for the failure of municipal police agencies to cope more effectively with these problems?"
1. Lack of jurisdiction. - While any city's police authority is limited to its city boundaries, the hoodlums' activities spread far beyond the metropolitan areas involved.
2. Lack of resources. - The need for the investment of funds and resources in the investigation of organized criminal activity is not readily apparent to the local taxpayer and it is difficult for the police administrator to demonstrate the return on those dollars which he might invest.
3. Lack of talent. - The average police officer cannot fight organized crime and the highly skilled attorneys and other professionals who are engaged by top crime leaders. The average police department doesn't have the attorneys, accountants, and tax experts required.
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4. Insulation of criminal leaders. - To peel away the layers of protective covering from the hard core of leadership, it is usually necessary to (a) persuade accomplices to testify; (b) plant undercover operatives within the syndicate; or (c) use electronic devices for intensive surveillance.
5. Inadequate substantive laws at the State level. - Top crime leaders do not overtly violate existing laws. When hauled into court, they are charged generally with misdemeanors although they may be directing vast criminal conspiracies. "The hard-to-realize fact is that we have not legislated it to be a crime to engage in that activity which we have come to refer to as organized crime, and it follows that there are no meaningful punitive sanctions to be imposed."
6. Failure to impose available sanctions. - Offenders are dismissed without punishment; failure to convict results from the use of legal technicalities.
The problems in the concerted drive to wipe out organized crime tend to consolidate into one fundamental obstacle, and many objectives tend to merge into one main target: the insulation of the hierarchy. The Attorney General stated that insulation was the principal problem at the outset of the hearings, and every witness who followed him made the same avowal.
COMMISSIONER MURPHY. You take the narcotics business * * * the key figures in this area would not be found within a quarter of a mile of any actual narcotics or anything that could possibly lead to their arrest (p.55).
* * * * *
MR. SHANLEY. * * * basically, the strongest insulation is supplied by a philosophy which permeates the group; i.e., that the boss must be protected * * * (p.67).
* * * * *
MR. WILSON. Today they are far removed from the cesspools of vice activities. Many of these hoodlums play the role of respected citizens * * * (p. 486).
All of the law enforcement officials agreed on a major fundamental issue in the national war on organized crime, that the process of insulation and its ancillary protective measures can operate successfully only in an atmosphere of public apathy, disinterest, ignorance, lack of cooperation, and absence of community responsibility.
Joseph Valachi was born in New York City on September 22, 1908, of parents who emigrated to the United States from Naples, Italy. He became a burglar when he was 18 years old, and before he was 20 he was sentenced to prison. Early in his criminal career, he was a member of the 107th Street gang and of the "Irish mob." Many of his associates in these gangs of hoodlums later became his fellow soldiers in the crime syndicate. Valachi was convicted of burglary again in 1925, and served 44 months in Sing Sing.
During his 8 years of criminal apprenticeship on the streets of New York, Joseph Valachi associated with so many men who later joined the Mafia that his own gravitation toward the secret society of crimi- nals was inevitable... After his second release from prison in 1930, he
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The Cosa Nostra war
The gangs of New York were about to engage in a murderous gang war that would not be ended until all the bosses of the gangs were murdered, with some of their underlings, and until the new leadership had emerged from the ranks and united the warring factions. In 1930, three separate gangs were engaged in the opening blows of what came to be known as "the Castellemarese war." The conflict eventually involved mobs of Italian extraction throughout the United States and it led directly to the evolution of syndicated crime. The war was started by Giuseppe Masseria, a ruthless gang leader of Neapolitan birth, who in 1930 passed death sentences upon prominent Sicilians in the American underworld, most of whom were natives of the area around the Gulf of Castellemare in Sicily. The main stake in the conflict, which lasted 14 months, was absolute control of the large segment of the underworld then in the hands of gang leaders of Italian nativity or lineage.
The blood-and-fire ceremony of Mafia initiation
During the gang war, Joseph Valachi became an initiated member of the Maranzano family in the secret society that he called Cosa Nostra. He said that he was taken to a house in upstate New York, where 80 to 85 men were gathered.
MR. VALACHI. * * * When I came in, I sat down and they were at the edge of the table, it was a long table, and there was a gun and a knife on the table * * *. I repeated some words they told me * * *. He [Maranzano] went on to explain that they lived by the gun and by the knife and * * * you die by the gun and by the knife * * * that is what the rules were, of Cosa Nostra * * * then he gave me a piece of paper, and I was to burn it * * *. This is the way I burn if I expose this organization (pp. 180-183).
Valachi explained that a "godfather" was chosen for him by lot - in his case, it was Joseph "Joe Bananas" Bonnano, who pricked Valachi's finger to draw blood as a symbol of brotherhood. Valachi testified (p. 185) to the rules which were explained to him: (1) The code of silence; (2) a prohibition against sexual involvement with wife or daughter of another member; (3) physical violence against another member.
In the meantime, the war and the gangland slayings continued, resulting in almost complete defeat for the Masseria forces. At the end of hostilities, Masseria was in hiding, with only five or six hoodlums remaining loyal to him (pp. 198-199). Among them were Charles "Lucky" Luciano and Vito Genovese.
The power struggle in the Mafia
Since the structure and organization of the present-day criminal syndicate that Joseph Valachi called Cosa Nostra had its genesis in the gangland war of 1930, a review of the evolution of leadership that resulted from the war is essential to understanding of the Mafia's underworld network in the 1960's.
Throughout the gang war, Maranzano's men had been trying to kill Giuseppe Masseria. When his gang had been reduced to a handful, Masseria's lieutenants decided to kill Masseria themselves, and thus [make peace] with Maranzano. Valachi identified the traitors as men...
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Terranova. They lured Masseria to a Coney Island restaurant on April 15, 1931, where he was killed by six gunshot wounds of the head and body.
Peace among the warring gangs then came quickly, but the men who had murdered Masseria were not content to accept survival and to take subordinate roles in the Maranzano organization. The power struggle was not finished as far as they were concerned.
Maranzano consolidated his victory with a meeting of 500 members of Cosa Nostra. There he declared himself "the boss of all bosses." At this meeting, according to Valachi, the hierarchy was established:
MR. VALACHI. * * * Then we have the boss and then we have an underboss under the boss. Then we have the caporegima. He [Maranzano] was explaining all this * * *. This is what I called the second government (p. 215).
Shortly after this big meeting at which the "families" of Cosa Nostra were established and their bosses named, Maranzano told Valachi that there would have to be another war. The first victims of Maranzano were supposed to be Charles Luciano and Vito Genovese; he hired the noted gunman Vincent "Mad Dog" Coll to kill. them. They acted first, however, according to Joseph Valachi, and Maranzano was killed in his New York City office by hired assassins.
Within 6 months, therefore, Giuseppe Masseria and Salvatore Maranzano were dead. Both of them were aspirants to the role of "boss of all bosses" in the Mafia in New York, and both of them were victims of the two-man combination that was now in position to seize power: Luciano and Genovese.
Under the new leadership, Joseph Valachi agreed to form the tie that would hold him for the next 30 years. At a meeting with Genovese, he was introduced to his new lieutenant, Anthony "Tony Bender" Strollo. His new boss was Luciano, and his underboss was Genovese.
The new organization
At this time, Luciano put into effect his new plan for a group of "consiglieri," consisting of six men to establish policy and settle disputes in the Cosa Nostra families. Valachi in his testimony distinguished between the consiglieri and the national commission of Cosa Nostra:
MR. ADLERMAN. Now, the consiglieri is different from the commission, is that right? * * * The commission is the council of the bosses themselves over the whole United States or wherever the families are in the United States?
MR. VALACHI. Right.
MR. ADLERMAN. So the council you are discussing now, the consiglieri of six, only affects the New York families and the New Jersey family?
MR. VALACHI. Right (p. 287).
The next step in Luciano's control procedure was to "close the books" of Cosa Nostra. The paths of membership were shut off in 1931 after the gangland war and were not reopened until 1954. Membership was limited to Sicilians from the turn of the century through the 1920's, and then was restricted to "full Italians," a phrase which Valachi explained as a requirement for Italian parentage on both sides of a man's family.
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14 ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
Syndicate membership was a desirable possession. In point of fact, a principal charge against Frank Scalise and Albert Anastasia, both murdered by their associates in Cosa Nostra, was that they were selling memberships after the books reopened in 1954 for $40,000 apiece (p. 239).
For three decades, Joseph Valachi led a remunerative criminal life that was uninterrupted by indictments and convictions. He was arrested several times during these years, but was always released without convictions. Indeed, he was not in serious trouble with the law until the latter 1950's, when he was charged with a succession of narcotics violations and landed in the Federal Penitentiary at Atlanta, Ga. During the 30 years of Valachi's membership, his Cosa Nostra family was bossed by Luciano, who was sent to prison in the 1930's and deported after the war and who died in Italy m 1962; then by a man named Chee Gusae, who substituted for Luciano and died while Luciano was in prison; then by Francesco "Frank Costello" Saveria, who was deposed by Vito Genovese in the 1950's; and finally by Vito Genovese himself, who fled to Italy to escape a murder charge in 1934 and who returned after World War II to stand trial. Following the poisoning of a prosecution witness, the charge was dismissed. Genovese took over the Mafia leadership for a considerable time before he was convicted and sent fo prison for a narcotics conspiracy.
Throughout his testimony, the witness referred time and again to his various means of livelihood, and most of them involved some form of criminal activity. An examination of the record reveals those upon which he gave specific testimony: burglary, shylocking or loansharking; operating dress factories; horseracing; owning jukeboxes; handling pinball machines; purchasing and selling illegally OPA ration stamps during the war; the policy racket; bookmaking: owning and operating a restaurant; sharing in the operation of a Cuban gambling casino; trafficking in narcotics.
Joseph Valachi's testimony about his own activities tends to reflect accurately, according to law enforcement officials, the widespread criminal activities of Cosa Nostra as a unit during the Luciano-Costello-Genovese period. For example, syndicated crime's main source of income is undoubtedly derived from gambling; of the 12 activities listed above for Valachi, 6 are directly or indirectly connected with illegal gambling. In late years, a remarkable number of Cosa Nostra leaders have gone to prison for engaging in the narcotics traffic; Valachi was among them, as were several of his close associates. Many of these convictions were obtained under the provisions of the Narcotics Control Act of 1956, the Boggs-Daniel Act. This legislation, which was enacted as a result of congressional hearings on the narcotics problem, has proved to be a strong and effective instrument of the law, and has been since its enactment the implementing force of the drive against the Mafia leaders who engage in the narcotics traffic.
Murder as a Mafia policy
To keep the organization operating in clandestine security, the Mafia chieftains quite frequently were impelled to resort to violence during Valachi's 30 years of membership. Joseph Valachi gave the subcommittee detailed accounts of numerous murders, although some of his testimony, given in executive session, cannot be made public in this report because of police investigations and pending court actions. His testimony in executive session about a total of 10 murders was corrobo-
14
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 15
rated by New York City police officials who listened to him and furnished information from their files to substantiate what Valachi had to say.
in public session, the testimony of Joseph Valachi about Mafia murders was audited by and commented upon by officers of the New York City Police Department. In almost every case mentioned by Valachi, police records verified the time and the place and the circumstances. The New York police officers regarded his testimony as most informative in explaining the motives and identities of murderers whose crimes had long been unsolved.
Joseph Valachi was either directly connected with or had intimate knowledge of each of the murder cases noted below, among many others. The slayings are listed in chronological order, beginning with the most recent.
1. The disappearance in 1962 and presumed murder of Anthony "Tony Bender" Strollo, who was Valachi's lieutenant in the Genovese family. Strollo disappeared while Genovese and Valachi were cellmates in Federal prison. Genovese's remarks left no doubt in Valachi's mind that Genovese had ordered Strollo's murder.
2. The disappearance in 1960 and presumed murder of Vincent "Jimmy Jerome" Squillante, Albert Anastasia's underling, who was reputed in underworld circles to be willing to work for Genovese, but who was killed instead.
3. The murder of Anthony "Little Augie Pisano" Carfano in September of 1959. Carfano incurred the wrath of Vito Genovese by insubordination.
4. The murder of Joe DeMarco in 1958 for violating Mafia rules against narcotics trafficking.
5. The murder of John Robilotto in 1958 as a consequence of the earlier murder of Albert Anastasia.
6. The disappearance in 1957 and presumed murder of Armand Rava as a consequence of the murder of Albert Anastasia.
7. The murder of Albert Anastasia in October of 1957, which Valachi testified was ordered by Vito Genovese, Carlo Gambino, and Joseph Biondo.
8. The murder of Joseph Scalise in September of 1957. Scalise had vowed vengeance for his brother's death.
9. The murder of Frank Scalise in June 1957. He was a Mafia leader, and his slaying was linked to the Anastasia purge of that year.
10. The murder of Steven "Don Steven" Padami, New Jersey boss of the Mafia, in March of 1955.
11. The killing of Eugene Giannini, engineered by Joseph Valachi in 1952, suggested by Charles Luciano from Italy, and ordered by Vito Genovese.[2]
12. The murder in 1952 of Valachi's long-time associate Steven "Steve Rinell" Rinelli.
13. The murder of Willie Moretti in 1951, ordered by the Mafia leaders because of his alleged mental and emotional instability.
[2] The Giannini murder case is cited as typical of the problems encountered in attempting to prosecute Mafia leaders for their crimes. According to Valachi's testimony (pp. 351-360), Vito Genovese ordered Valachi to supervise the murder, and it was carried out by Joe Pagano and Fiore Siano. Sergeant Ralph Salerno testified in verification of time, place, and circumstances. In the interim, however, the case against Vito Genovese has been weakened by the disappearance and presumed murder of Fiore Siano, who vanished in April of 1964 as the case against Genovese was being developed.
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16 ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
14. The death in 1941 of Abe Reles, who informed on "Murder, Inc.," and who therefore was thrown to his death, according to Valachi, from a Coney Island hotel room window.
15. The murder in 1931 of Frank "Big Dick" Amato. He was an original member of Valachi's burglary gang.
16. The murder of "Buster from Chicago" in 1931. This man was Joseph Valachi's companion-in-arms on murder assignments, but Valachi was unable to remember his proper name. He was shot to death as he left a dice game shortly after Maranzano's death.
17. Three murders carried out on the same day in 1931 as the slay ing of Salvatore Maranzano - James "Jimmy Marino" Lepore, who was a Mafia lieutenant, Sam Monica, and Louis Russo.
Joseph Valachi's testimony about certain of these murders, among many others, placed beside police verification of details and presumed motives, as well as the chronology of events themselves, all lead to significant conclusions about a second major power struggle in Cosa Nostra. The man who managed eventually to sweep all opponents from the field was Vito Genovese.
"Boss of all bosses under the table"
After Masseria and Maranzano were murdered, Vito Genovese, then in his middle thirties, was the obvious heir apparent to Charles "Lucky" Luciano. Genovese, however, was accused in 1934 of the murder of Ferdinand "The Shadow" Boccia, and fled to Italy. He remained there for almost 12 years, throughout World War II.
In the meantime, Charles Luciano was tried and convicted of compulsory prostitution. With Genovese in Italy and Luciano in prison, Frank Costello took over as boss of the most important family in Cosa Nostra.
Genovese returned to the United States in June of 1945, just a few months before Luciano was removed from a New York State prison to be deported to Italy. The murder charge against Genovese was dismissed because the chief witness was poisoned, and Genovese returned to the underworld that he had left some 12 years before. He did not, however, automatically pick up the strength, prestige, and profits that he had enjoyed as underboss to Luciano. There were men in his way, and succeeding events indicate that he had to drive ruthlessly to regain the pinnacle of power.
Genovese needed a certain amount of time to consolidate his position and to insure his strength. Willie Moretti was the first to go of those who stood in the path of Vito Genovese. On October 4, 1951, in a hoodlum hangout in Cliffside Park, N.J., Willie Moretti was shot twice in the head.
On the evening of May 2, 1957, the reputed top man of the New York underworld, Frank Costello, entered the lobby of his Manhattan apartment house. He was shot in the head by an unidentified gunman. Even though the murder attempt failed, Costello was removed from a leading position in the Cosa Nostra hierarchy.
MR. ADLERMAN. * * * At that time was there any question of the fact that Genovese had then assumed leadership of the family?
INSPECTOR SHANLEY. There was no question (p. 250).
On the 25th of October in the same year, 1957, Albert Anastasia was shot to death in a barbershop in a New York hotel. Joseph Valachi
16
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 17
explained that the killing was done, according to the Cosa Nostra rules, by Anastasia's subordinates, Carlo Gambino and Joe Biondo, with the approval of Vito'Genovese.
Within 3 weeks of the murder of Albert Anastasia, Genovese was scheduled to explain and justify it at a meeting on November 14, 1957, at the Apalachin, N.Y, country estate of Cosa Nostra member Joseph Barbara.[3]
Vito Genovese had scarcely consolidated his regime when he was arrested in 1958 for narcotic conspiracy under the Narcotics Control Law of 1956, tried and convicted, and sentenced to 15 years in the penitentiary, where he is now imprisoned.
He could utilize his tremendous power even though he was within prison walls. Joseph Valachi testified about the disappearance of his Cosa Nostra lieutenant, Anthony "Tony Bender" Strollo, who has been missing since April 8, 1962
MR. VALACHI. Vito Genovese told me [in the cell they shared] that it was the best thing that could have happened to Tony, because Tony couldn't take it, "like-you and I * * *." Like he couldn't take time, to put it this way, time in prison, or long prison sentence, and so that is the best thing that could have happened * * *. It meant that in our language, that, he had ordered his death (p. 87).
As Joseph: Valachi significantly testified, "* * * they eliminated the boss of all bosses, but Vito Genovese is a boss of all bosses under the table" (p.88).
Joseph Valachi made his decision to testify about Cosa Nostra after he became convinced that Vito Genovese had sentenced him to death by gangland execution while they «were cellmates in the Federal Penitentiary at Atlanta, Ga.
As Valachi reconstructed the series of events in his testimony, it was apparent that Genovese had been told by another prisoner that Joseph Valachi was an informer. Valachi was made aware of Genovese's changed attitude toward him in their cell one night, when Genovese related to him a version of an ancient aphorism.
MR. VALACHI. * * * he says, "You know, sometimes if I had a barrel of apples, and one of these apples is touched * * * not all rotten but a little touched * * * it has to be removed or it will touch all the rest of the apples" (p. 94).
The witness testified that Genovese then approached him and kissed him on the cheek, an act which Valachi interpreted as the traditional "kiss of death," and which has been attributed for centuries to the Mafia. Believing he was marked for execution, Joseph Valachi asked to be placed in solitary confinement. He was there 4 days before he was returned to his original cell, shared with Genovese and several other prisoners. The certainty that he was sentenced to death preyed upon Valachi's mind. A few days later, on May 22, 1962, he was exercising in the prison yard, alone, when he saw ahead of him a man he thought to be a Cosa Nostra member named "Joe Beck" (Joseph DiPalermo) who, in his opinion, had been given the assignment to kill
[3]The Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field held public hearings on the Apalachin meeting in June and July of 1958, and the record of those hearings is pt. 32 of the select committee's record. Many of the witnesses who appeared at those hearings are identified in this report as members of Cosa Nostra.
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18 ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
him. Valachi seized a piece of iron pipe from a nearby construction project and struck the man in the head several times. The prisoner, a man named John Joseph Saupp. who bore a remarkable physical resemblance to Joe Beck, died as a result of the attack. Joseph Valachi was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder, in addition to the two terms of 15 and 20 years that he was currently serving for narcotics trafficking. Believing that his execution by Cosa Nostra was now inevitable, Joseph Valachi sought the aid of Federal agents, with the intention of telling his story of 30 years as an organization soldier.
One of the most important criminal enterprises of the Mafia is now and has always been illegal gambling. Police Commissioner Murphy of New York City stated that gambling is a major producer of revenue for organized crime, adding that the proceeds of gambling are channeled into many other illegal fields, including narcotics and "shylocking" or loansharking. Mr. Murphy said that from the law enforcement point of view, gambling is the foremost racket in his city and is the most serious problem as a source of corruption and of illegal revenue to the underworld. "Every man," he stated, "who puts a $2 bet on a horse with a bookmaker or on a policy slip is contributing to support of organized crime in this country" (p. 58).
Inspector Shanley of the New York Police Department estimated (p. 73) that the daily volume of gambling income for the Cosa Nostra hierarchy is probably a quarter of a million dollars in New York City alone. Attorney General Kennedy pointed out to the subcommittee that the Department of Justice had estimated some time previously that illegal gambling alone had a gross volume of $7 billion annually, and that current operations in his Department verified that figure.
While testimony in these hearings emphasized the basic and ultimate mportance of financial returns from gambling, details were given by expert witnesses about Cosa Nostra's constant operation in literally dozens of other criminal activities. Illicit traffic in narcotics, for example, was stressed repeatedly as a major source of enormous profits to syndicate members.
The kind of power that has been wielded in labor racketeering by gangsters is illustrated by the testimony of Joseph Valachi, who called upon the notorious John Dioguardi when he had labor troubles in his clothing business:
MR. VALACHI. Senator, I had a dress shop, a negligee and dress contract, on Prospect Avenue. I never belonged in any union. If I got in trouble, any union organizer came around, all I had to do was call up John Dio or Tommy Dio and all my troubles were straightened out (p. 277).
Probably the most important crime of all, in terms of its intrinsic value to the strength of the crime network, is murder. The source of the appalling power of Cosa Nostra in the underworld is the well-known inevitability of the death penalty for offenders and informers. Statistics on the unsolved gangland murders in various metropolitan areas will be found in this report in the following sections dealing with those areas in detail.
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ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 19
Captain William Duffy, director of intelligence for the Chicago Police Department, commented upon the significance of gangland's ability to murder with impunity:
MR. DUFFY. From countless investigations, and after long analysis, we have concluded that the one single characteristic which is most responsible for the success and continuity of this crime syndicate is the ability of the group to commit murder and other acts of violence without compunction.
* * * * *
* * * People have just refused to cooperate, stating that they were afraid for their lives (pp. 512-513).
The Nation's largest city is the principal scene of organized criminal operations. Cosa Nostra, according to Joseph Valachi and law enforcement witnesses, has five families in Metropolitan New York and an allied branch in contiguous New Jersey. Valachi testified (p. 271) that these families contained, in his experienced estimate, about 2,000 active members and perhaps 2,500 to 3,000 inactive members.
Inspector Shanley of the New York City Police Department stated (p. 264) that the five families identified and described by the witness constitute a substantial part of the organized crime element in the city of New York.
The subcommittee's staff introduced in evidence five charts showing the hierarchy and membership, in part, of the five New York families. These charts, which identify the criminals by names and aliases and which show their criminal activities and their ranking in the individual families, are printed in this report. References to them will be found on succeeding pages, as they are discussed in connection with the individual families.
Joseph Valachi himself identified 289 hoodlums of the 338 men shown on the charts as criminals who were members of the Mafia. The remaining identities and rankings were supplied by Federal and local law enforcement agencies through criminal records and information supplied by other informants. Valachi stated that he knew the size of the Genovese and Gambino families in the New York underworld - "just about the same, as far as the number of soldiers are concerned" (p. 82). He testified: "* * * Vito Genovese has about 450, in and around that * * * about 450, yes, sir. It could be even 500, but I am giving 1t roughly" (p. 81).
Testifying about the five charts, Valachi identified as Cosa Nostra members 133 of the 143 men shown on the chart that represented the family of Vito Genovese. In the Lucchese family, he identified 56 of 57 men; in the Gambino family, 64 of 80; in the family of the late Joseph Profaci, 19 of 37; in the Bonnano family, 17 of 21.
The largest and most powerful Cosa Nostra family in New York is led by Vito Genovese.
While Genovese is in prison, his family is headed by Thomas Eboli (also known as "Tommy Ryan"), long a notorious associate of Genovese. The so-called "underboss" in the Genovese group is Gerardo Catena and the "consigliere" or adviser on policy is Michele Miranda, both of whom have long and unsavory criminal associations.
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20 ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
Joseph Valachi, in his testimony describing the Cosa Nostra structure, emphasized the importance of the "caporegime" or lieutenants in each family, who are in direct charge of the lower ranking members called "soldiers" or "button men." Notorious lieutenants in the Genovese family are Vincent Alo, known as "Jimmy Blue Eyes"; James Angelina; Pasquale "Patsy Ryan" Eboli; and Michael Coppola, who is known by the sinister sobriquet of "Trigger Mike." Former Genovese lieutenants included gangsters of national notoriety like Joseph "Joe Adonis" Doto, Ciro Terranova, Willie Moretti, and Anthony Carfano, also known as "Little Augie Pisano." The Genovese family is shown in a chart introduced in the hearings (p. 248, pt. 3) by Inspector Shanley of the New York City Police Department. The testimony of Inspector Shanley (p. 248) showed that the 142 men on the Genovese chart had been arrested a total of 1,064 times, an average of 7 arrests per man. He explained that one of every four men had been arrested for murder in the first degree. On the average, each man had been arrested once on a dangerous weapons charge. One of each two men had been arrested on narcotics charges, and the same average had applied on gambling and assault charges.
(The roster of the Vito Genovese family follows:)
Successor to:
Messenger, Michael Genovese, FBI No. 4373762.
Successor to: *Anthony Strollo, alias "Tony Bender," N.Y.C.P.D, B-64086, FBI No. 4282858, missing and presumed murdered (1D, 2, 3, 4).
Present
Successor to: *Joseph Doto, alias "Joe Adonis," FBI No. 500268.
Successor to: *Ciro Terranova, alias "The Artichoke King," N.Y.C.P.D. B-78616, deceased (6).
Key to activity code at end of list.
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ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 21
Former
Soldiers—Buttons
Soldiers—Buttons
Soldiers—Buttons
Key to activity code at end of list.
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22 ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
Soldiers—Buttons
Soldiers—Buttons
22
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 23
Soldiers—Buttons
1A. Currently in jail for narcotics.
1B. Awaiting trial for narcotics
1C. Previous conviction for narcotics.
1D. Suspected of being active in narcotics.
2. Gambling.
3. Shylocking.
4. Labor racketeering.
5. Vending machines and/or jukeboxes.
6. Extortion, strong arm and murder,
7. Counterfeiting.
8. Criminally receiving.
9. Alcohol tax violations.
*Identified by Joseph Valachi.
† Members convicted as a result of U.S. Bureau of Narcotics investigations.
The second New York family of Cosa Nostra that was discussed in the hearings was the organization headed by Gaetano Lucchese, also known as Three-Finger Brown and Tommy Brown. Allegedly a garment manufacturer, Lucchese has a police record of 21 arrests for grand larceny alone. He was arrested on four other occasions, twice for homicide, Joseph Valachi testified that Lucchese was an active and influential leader of Cosa Nostra throughout his 30 years of membership. Lucchese's underboss is Stefano LaSalle, and his "consigliere" is Vincent Rao, who was a fence for the goods stolen by
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24 ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
Valachi's burglary gang back in the 1920's. Among Lucchese's lieutenants, Joseph Valachi identified Anthony "Tony Ducks" Corallo, now in Federal prison and long familiar to the subcommittee because of his activities as an officer of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, and John "Big John" Ormento, now serving a long sentence in Federal prison for narcotics trafficking. Among the Lucchese soldiers named by Valachi was John Dioguardi, also known as "Johnny Dio," a well-known hoodlum and labor racketeer, who was closely associated with James R. Hoffa, president of the Teamsters.
The roster of the Lucchese family is shown in a chart printed in the record facing page 274, part 1. Inspector Shanley testified about the criminal records of the Lucchese people. The 53 individuals named on the Lucchese chart had amassed a total of 387 arrests, approximately 7 per man. Three of every five men had been arrested in narcotics cases, one of each four had been arrested for homicide, one of two arrested for aggravated assault, and four out of five arrested for gambling and for carrying dangerous weapons.
(The roster of the Gaetano Lucchese family follows:)
Key to activity code at end of list.
24
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 25
1A. Currently in jail for narcotics.
1B. Awaiting trial for narcotics.
1C. Previous conviction for narcotics.
1D. Suspected of being active in narcotics.
2. Gambling.
3. Shylocking.
4. Labor racketeering.
5. Vending machines and/or jukeboxes.
6. Extortion, strongarm and murder.
7. Counterfeiting.
8. Criminally receiving.
9. Alcohol tax violations.
*Identified by Joseph Valachi.
†Members convicted as result. of U.S. Bureau of Narcotics investigations.
The family of Carlo Gambino is shown in a chart printed in the record facing page 294, part 1. This was the family headed by Albert Anastasia until he was murdered in 1957 on orders of Genovese, Gambino, and Joe Biondo, present underboss to Gambino. Anastasia was in turn preceded by Philip and Vincent Mangano - Vincent Mangano has been missing since 1951 and Philip Mangano was murdered in the same year. The Gambino family has frequently lost leaders in gangland killings; in addition to the Manganos and Anastasia, underboss Frank Scalise was killed in 1957, and other murder victims of caporegime rank were John "Johnny Roberts" Robilotto, Vincent "Jimmy Jerome" Squillante, and Armand Rava.
Inspector Shanley offered a concise summary of the composite criminal record of the Gambino family:
Mr. Shanley. We made a breakdown in connection with the number of arrests and this chart shows that there are six arrests for each man mentioned. There is one arrest out of every five men for homicide on an average. Three out of every four have been arrested at least once for dangerous weapons. One out of every three has been arrested at least once on an average for narcotics. One out of one has been arrested for gambling. Two out of five have been arrested for felonious assault.
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26 ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
The total number of arrests, 476. One man has 31 arrests. Carlo Gambino is considered to be the boss. He is suspected of being active in narcotics. He is in gambling, shylocking, labor racketeering, vending machines, extortion, criminally receiving, and alcohol tax violation. He has been arrested 16 times. He has six convictions * * * (p. 294).
(The roster of the Carlo Gambino family follows:)
Successor to:
Successor to:
Present
Former
Key to activity code at end of list.
26
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 27
Key to activity code at end of list.
27
28 ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
1A. Currently in jail for narcotics.
1B. Awaiting trial for narcotics.
1C. Previous conviction for narcotics.
1D. Suspected of being active in narcotics.
2. Gambling.
3. Shylocking.
4. Labor racketeering.
5. Vending machines and/or jukeboxes.
6. Extortion, strongarm, and murder.
7. Counterfelting.
8. Criminally receiving.
9. Alcohol tax violations.
*Identified by Joseph Valachi.
†Members convicted as result of U.S. Bureau of Narcoties investigations.
The fourth New York family examined by the subcommittee was the group led by Giuseppe Magliocco, alias "Joe Malyak." Magliocco, who died of natural causes in December of 1963, was the short-term successor to his late brother-in-law, Giuseppe Profaci, known as "The Old Man," who was a top-ranking American gangster for more than three decades — ever since he was an important figure in the Masseria-Maranzano gang war in the early 1930's.
The Magliocco family follows all the other families in the criminal pattern. For the 87 men shown on the chart printed in the record facing page 308, part 1, there are 319 arrests recorded. One out of three was arrested for homicide; the group averages one arrest per man for dangerous weapons; one of three has been arrested on narcotics charges; there is one arrest per man for gambling; and two out of three were arrested for felonious assault.
The Magliocco (formerly Profaci) family is the Mafia group that has gained national notoriety by being embroiled in internecine warfare for the past several years; it is the family in which the Gallo brothers and their henchmen are members. The gang war, a power struggle between the traditional Cosa Nostra leadership represented by Profaci and Magliocco and the more violent and reckless element represented by the Gallo brothers, has resulted in many casualties. Nine men are dead, three are missing and presumed murdered and there have been at least nine additional assaults with intent to kill. These acts of violence occurred in the 2 years between August of 1961 and August of 1963 (p. 378).
(The Magliocco roster follows:)
Successor to:
Key to legends at end of list.
28
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 29
1A. Currently in jail for narcotics.
1B. Awaiting trial for narcotics.
1C. Previous conviction for narcotics.
1D. Suspected of being active in narcotics.
2. Gambling.
3. Shylocking.
4. Labor racketeering.
5. Vending machines and/or jukeboxes.
6. Extortion, strongarm, and murder.
7. Counterfeiting.
8. Criminally receiving.
9. Alcohol tax violations.
*Identified by Joseph Valachi.
†Members convicted as result of U.S. Bureau of Narcotics investigations.
The fifth family in the Cosa Nostra structure in New York was headed, at the time of the hearings, by Joseph "Joe Bananas" Bonnano, an organization leader for three decades.[4] His underboss was Carmine Galante, who is currently in prison for violation of the narcotics laws. This group, shown on a chart facing page 313, part 1, of the record, had 119 overall arrests at the time of the hearings, an average of 5 per man. One of four has been arrested for homicide, one of two for carrying dangerous weapons, one of three for narcotics violations, one of seven for gambling, and one of two for assault.
[4]Bonnano supposedly was kidnapped in New York City on the eve of his appearance before a Federal grand jury in October 1964.
44-253--65--3
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30 ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
(The roster of the Bonnano family follows:)
Successor to: Giovanni Bonventre, FBI No. 828984-C now retired in Sicily.
1A. Currently in jail for narcotics.
1B. Awaiting trial for narcotics.
1C. Previous conviction for narcotics.
1D. Suspected of being active in narcotics.
2. Gambling.
3. Shylocking.
4. Labor racketeering.
5. Vending machines and/or jukeboxes.
6. Extortion, strong arm, and murder.
7. Counterfeiting.
8. Criminally receiving.
9. Alcohol tax violations.
*Identified by Joseph Valachi.
†Members convicted as result of U.S. Bureau of Narcotics investigations.
Click image to view larger
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ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 31
In extended testimony about the criminal activities of the men who are members of the Cosa Nostra families named by Joseph Valachi, the New York City Police Department, through Inspector Shanley, introduced and testified about a chart summarizing the police records of the 338 men identified as members of Cosa Nostra. This chart is printed in this report on page 30 and it is an excellent guide in determining the incidence of violence in the operations of New York's organized underworld. Of the 3,887 arrests compiled by these gangsters, 119 were for homicide; 463 were for carrying dangerous weapons, 260 were for assaults which fell short of murder. It should be remembered that the 338 identified members represent only a fraction of the estimated Mafia membership in New York.
The family charts and the summaries of criminal activities for New York's Cosa Nostra were all prepared by New York City Police Department officials, with the aid of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics, and the subcommittee's staff. The basic information they contain was established by precise and meticulous checking of the details and identities furnished by Joseph Valachi against criminal intelligence already at hand in the various agencies involved. The percentage of confirmation was remarkably high. This was brought out during the testimony of Inspector Shanley, who was speaking in reference to the chart of the Genovese family specifically, but expanded his remarks to comment on the value of all the information given by Joseph Valachi:
Mr. Shanley. I would say this chart is one of the most accurate we have been able to put together in years. The. deeper you go into it the more apparent it becomes that the information is extremely accurate. Previously, we have had cases where the top people were named, the more notorious ones have been named in the various hearings for years. But this is the first time in our experience where a man has gone into the genesis of it, he has given the structure, he has given the succession. He has given the administration, he has given the procedure. In addition to that, he has given it depth (p. 261).
Mr. Shanley was then asked if he believed the Valachi narrative to be effective for the work of his department. He stated firmly that it was, since it furnished an intelligence weapon never available before. He added that the Valachi story on the evolution of Cosa Nostra from the days of gang warfare was vital information for the New York police, since organized crime is very deceptive in appearance, being like an iceberg with much of its body below the surface. Mr. Shanley pointed out that while the Mafia represents only one specific aspect of organized crime in New York, it is a substantial part of that criminal activity, and that the five families of Cosa Nostra can be justifiably described as the hard core of the organized criminal element of New York City. He stated (p. 75) that the New York police had received recent confidential information to indicate that the Valachi testimony was a matter of deep concern to the Mafia leaders, emphasizing the fact that Joseph Valachi knew exactly what he was talking about when he revealed the secrets of the organization in New York."
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32 ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
Police Commissioner Michael J. Murphy, of New York, in his testimony, described the city's fight against organized crime and termed the foe "resilient, resourceful, and unregenerate." Mr. Murphy stated that the emphasis of the battle has changed within the past 10 years, citing statistics to show that the New York City police, in 1962, made an arrest for violation of the gambling laws every 17 minutes - a total of 28,888, and an arrest for a narcotics violation every hour - a total of 7,914. Commissioner Murphy was reluctant to state which of the two crimes was paramount in importance to law enforcement in New York but he did say that each of them was of equal urgency and that no other organized crime or racket could properly be placed in the same prime category. Mr. Murphy declared that estimates traced one-third of the total felonies in the city to narcotics addicts.
Officials of the Chicago Police Department testified to a detailed pattern of structure and activities for organized crime that was strikingly similar to that already presented for New York.
Superintendent of Police O. W. Wilson declared that organized crime feeds upon gambling, prostitution, and illegal narcotics and liquor trafficking, while the most powerful hoodlums in these areas seem to be citizens of respectability who are supposedly engaged in legitimate business activities. He defined the approach of his department to syndicated crime as threefold: (1) suppressing vice operations; (2) gathering information on known hoodlums; and (3) developing evidence for the prosecution of the top men in organized crime. Chicago has made great strides, Mr. Wilson said, in the first two efforts but has not yet succeeded, significantly, in the third.
My. Wilson, in summarizing the results of intelligence efforts against the criminal conspiracy, gave the subcommittee a composite picture of today's gang leaders:
Mr. Wilson. Much of what we know confirms common impressions: that certain key racketeers have amassed great wealth; that they make income tax returns in which tremendous incomes are reported from undisclosed sources; that they continually associate with others of their kind who have no known legitimate sources of income or wealth; that when called before Senate and House investigating committees, they invariably plead the fifth amendment; that they are continually the subjects of comment in the public press and on the radio and television where they are labeled as gambling czars and vice lords; and that they never deny such accusations or bring suits for libel or slander against news media for making such accusations (p. 487).
Mr. Wilson gave a cogent reason why the amassed information so frequently will not stand concretely in courts of law in order to send these key racketeers to prison: "The most nefarious action of those engaged in organized crime is their resort to murder in order to maintain discipline within their organization" (p. 487).
Superintendent Wilson then testified to one of the most shocking statistics the subcommittee heard during these hearings. Since 1919, in the Chicago area, there have been 976 gangland murders of which
32
ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 33
only 2 have been cleared by the arrest and conviction of the murderers. Mr. Wilson pointed out that gangsters seem to enjoy odds of 500 to 1 against being caught and convicted while, in contrast, some 62 percent of non-gangland murders.on a national basis were cleared by arrests and convictions.
Mr. Wilson declared that the public attitude toward gangland murders has been one of complete apathy in which the killings have been written off as deserved deaths of hoodlums at the hands of other hoodlums.
Mr. Wilson's selection of a time frame, from 1919 until the present, for his astounding compilation of Chicago murders was apparently chosen with a view to the fortunes of organized crime because it was in 1919 that Alphonse "Scarface Al" Capone arrived in Chicago.
The first major leader of organized crime in Chicago was "Big Jim" Colosimo, a murder victim who was succeeded by one of his lieutenants, John Torrio. Capone was a young gangster of considerable notoriety in New York when Torrio brought him to Chicago. Gambling, prostitution, and liquor interests made Torrio a wealthy man by 1924, when he abdicated the throne of crime in favor of young Al Capone.
An era of unprecedented violence, murder, and corruption descended upon Chicago which was not broken when Capone went to prison in 1931. With the end of prohibition and its lucrative returns from bootlegging operations, Capone's successors - led by Frank Nitti, Paul Ricca, Louis "Little New York" Campagna, Jake Guzik, and others - engaged in extortion rackets, kidnaping, labor racketeering, all forms of vice, with gambling operations as the syndicate's principal source of income. In 1983, there were 35 murders concerned with the control of Chicago's gambling. During this time, the Capone mob was affiliated swith the New York City leaders of Cosa Nostra - men like Lucky-Luciano, Frank Costello, and Joe Adonis.
The crime leadership in Chicago was traced in a direct line by Joseph F. Morris, deputy superintendent of police in Chicago. Colosimo was a murder victim; Torrio handed over the reins to Capone; Frank Nitti succeeded to leadership and lasted until 1948, when he committed suicide; Paul Ricca, known as "Paul the Waiter," took Nitti's place and he, in turn, was succeeded by Anthony Accardo, alias "Joe Batters." The Chicago Police Department believes that the underworld leadership is now in the hands of Gilormo Giangono, who has national notoriety under one of his aliases, Sam "Mooney" Giancana. Mr. Morris furnished the subcommittee with some of the unsavory background for Accardo and Giancana in his statement:
Mr. Morris. Tony Accardo * * * came up through the ranks of the outfit. He was one of a group suspected in the St. Valentine Day murders. He was an intimate of such terrorists as Al Capone, "Machinegun" Jack McGurn, Claude Maddox, "Tough" Tony Capezio, "Dago" Lawrence Mangano, "Cherry Nose" Gioe * * *.
Accardo operated gambling joints that repaid him handsomely. He engineered the mob's efforts to take over the racing information service. He muscled his way into the policy racket in Chicago and into a lucrative gambling setup in Florida. His influence is also felt in the labor field.
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34 ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
Giancana has the same general background as most of the syndicate hoods. He was a member of the infamous "42" gang which, in the early 1950's, were known as the "young bloods" * * * such characters as Sam Battaglia, Marshall Caifano, Phil Alderisio * * * (p. 504).
Captain William J. Duffy, director of intelligence for the Chicago Police Department, furnished the subcommittee with the detailed information about the syndicate that operates organized crime in Chicago. Like the other police officials who testified before the subcommittee, Captain Duffy pinpointed the group he was talking about:
When I use the term "crime syndicate" I am referring to a particular criminal organization known variously in the Chicago area as "the outfit," "the mob," the "Mafia," and most recently, "Cosa Nostra" * * * (p. 506).
Captain Duffy estimated that there are 300 men in the Chicago area who devote their full efforts to organizing, directing, and controlling a far greater number of people involved in criminal activities like gambling, narcotics distribution, pandering, loan sharking, labor racketeering, and terrorism. Captain Duffy then furnished a comprehensive but succinct, portrait of Mafia leadership.
Captain Duffy declared that the syndicate plans its operations on a continuing long-term basis and that the Chicago police have observed a system of training and promotion in which today's leaders school their heirs apparent. Captain Duffy stated that his office believes that there are 26 men who lead 300 full-time gangsters in control of Chicago's organized crime. These men are divided by the Chicago police into two groups, one of which is known as the "Mafia" group, and is shown in exhibit No. 39, printed in the record facing page 508, part 2. The other group consists of the "Associates of the Chicago Italian Organization," and is shown in exhibit No. 40, printed in the record facing page 509, part 2.
Captain Duffy identified the bosses and lieutenants who he said are the powers in Chicago crime, and they are shown on the charts. Prominent in his testimony about the first group were such well-known hoodlums as Sam "Mooney" Giancana; Anthony Accardo; Felice DeLucia (Paul "The Waiter" Ricca); and Rocco Fischetti. Among the associates he named Murray "The Camel" Humphreys and Gus Alex.
He emphasized that the power of the Chicago organization rests in a single characteristic that is reflected in the police records of these leaders - the ability of the group to commit murder and other acts of violence without fear of retribution. Time and again, Captain Duffy declared, the Chicago police have been frustrated by the terror which this group of people rouses in both the underworld and the legitimate community itself.
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ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 35
(The rosters of the Chicago Mafia group and its associates follow :)
(W (west side); N (north side); S (south side).)
Key to legends at end of list.
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36 ORGANIZED CHIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
Key to legends at end of list.
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ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 37
1A. Currently in jail for narcotics trafficking.
1B. Awaiting trial on narcotics trafficking.
1C. Previous conviction for narcotics trafficking.
1D. Suspected of trafficking in narcotics.
2. Gambling.
3. Shylocking.
4. Labor racketeering.
5. Coin machine racketeering.
6. Extortion, mayhem, and murders.
7. Counterfeiting.
8. Receiving stolen goods.
9. Bootlegging.
10. Bribery.
11. Burglary, robbery, and larceny.
12. Tax exasion.
13. Aggravated assault.
14. Vice (prostitution).
15. Illegal possession of weapons.
16. Hijacking.
17. Contempt.
18. Obstruction of justice.
(W (West Side); S (South Side).)
Key to legends at end of list.
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38 ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
1A. Currently in jall for narcotics trafficking.
1B. Awaiting trial on narcotics trafficking.
1C. Previous conviction for narcotics trafficking.
1D. Suspected of trafficking in narcotics.
2. Gambling.
3. Shylocking.
4. Labor racketeering.
5. Coin machine racketeering.
6. Extortion, mayhem, and murders.
7. Counterfeiting.
8. Receiving stolen goods.
9. Bootlegging.
10. Bribery.
11. Burglary, robbery, and larceny.
12. Tax evasion.
13. Aggravated assault.
14. Vice (prostitution).
15. Illegal possession of weapons.
16. Hijacking.
17. Contempt.
18. Obstruction of justice.
Police officials from Detroit, Mich., headed by the police commissioner, George C. Edwards, appeared at the subcommittee's hearings to state, in their belief, that there is a nationally organized crime syndicate active in every large city in the country. Commissioner Edwards filled in the background for Detroit which Mr. Valachi admittedly did not possess.
* * * There are various names by which this outfit is known * * *. Tt is called the syndicate a great deal. It is called the Mafia a great deal * * *. This organization has its top command figures active in every large city in the country, including Detroit, and has been and continues to be the dominant factor in organized crime in America.
The organization to which we in Detroit apply the name "Mafia" appears to be very similar to and directly connected with the group in New York characterized by Valachi as "Cosa Nostra" (p. 408).
Mr. Edwards identified a group of five men, all with long police records, whom he called "the ruling council" of the Mafia organization in the Detroit area and whom he frequently referred to as "The Dons": Joseph Zerilli; John "Papa John" Priziola; Peter Licavoli; Angelo Meli; and William "Black Bill" Tocco.
Mr. Edwards declared that he believed that the ancient Mafia's code of silence, of fear, of refusal to cooperate with the law - characteristics of the Sicilian combine - were prime factors in today's operation of modern organized crime. The Detroit police prepared and introduced at the hearings a chart which was, in fact, titled "The Mafia Organization in the Detroit Area," and that chart, containing names, pictures, and criminal activity code for 63 criminals of importance, is printed facing page 410 of part 2 of the record.
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ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 39
Mr. Edwards further testified (p. 408): "We believe that this conspiracy grosses an absolute minimum of $150 million a year in a variety of illegal enterprises in the Detroit area. We believe that these persons dominate gambling and narcotic traffic in the Detroit area * * *. Mafia figures have also infiltrated legitimate businesses worth, we believe, a minimum of another $50 million."
The Detroit police placed 10 other prominent gangsters on the second level of operations, calling them "The Big Men" as administrators of crime and heirs apparent to the top bosses. Other subdivisions of authority located 10 lesser hoodlums as "chiefs of operating units," 11 more as "lieutenants," and 27 as "section leaders" in the Detroit area, which includes Windsor, Canada, and most of the southern part of the State of Michigan.
Mr. Edwards stressed repeatedly, in his testimony, the firm belief of his department that there is a "cement" that binds the organization together and ties it to similar outfits throughout the country and that this cement consists of group loyalty, group self-interest, and the use of violence to establish supremacy through fear. He pointed out, for example, that two of the "dons" in Detroit, Zerilli and Tocco, were born in the same year in the village of Terrasina, Sicily. A third member of the ruling. council, Licavoli, was born in St. Louis but his parents were born in Terrasina. At the administration level, "Scarface Joe" Bommarito was born in the United States but his parents were born in Terrasina.
The interfamily relationships are indicated on the Detroit Mafia chart, printed facing page 410 of part 2 of the record, where family connections are coded with the letter "A" and the pertinent numbers assigned to various gangsters on the chart. Mr. Edwards testified further that the families' ties extend between the top Mafia families in Detroit and other families of the organization elsewhere in the Nation. For example, he noted that one of Joseph Zerilli's sons is married to a daughter of Joseph Profaci, late notorious Mafia leader in New York, and that "Black Bill" Tocco's son married another Profaci daughter in a wedding that was attended by Cosa Nostra leaders from many other areas ofthe United States.
Further evidence of significant intergroup relationships was given by Inspector Miller, of the Detroit police, who testified that Joseph Barbara, Jr., whose father was host in the 1957 Apalachin meeting, is currently No. 25 on the Detroit Mafia chart. Young Barbara married the daughter of Peter Vitale, No. 23 on the Detroit chart, and is operator of the hoodlum-owned Tri-County Sanitation Co.
Commissioner Edwards testified that murder has always been a potent weapon in the arsenal of organized crime and he stated that there had been, between 1927 and 1962, at least 69 gangland murders in the Detroit area. Mr. Edwards identified the principal rackets known by Detroit police to be controlled by the Mafia: gambling, including bookmaking and numbers; narcotics trafiicking; prostitution; shylocking; labor racketeering; and extortion.
Mr. Edwards stressed, in his testimony, the four factors that he identified as the strong pillars in the structure of organized crime, not only in Detroit but in the rest of the Nation. He emphasized public complacency as probably the first and most important. The second factor is the calculated use of murder as a weapon to instill fear of
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40 ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
the organization throughout the underworld; the third is the use of political influence - the use of go-betweens - to give rackets and racketeers an apparently legitimate area of influence; the fourth tool is outright corruption, which the criminals still consistently use in attempting to bribe police officers and other public officials.
Commenting upon the serious problem of public complacency, Mr. Edwards told the subcommittee that his testimony would shock many of his fellow Detroiters, who see little evidence of the prevalence of gambling, narcotics, or prostitution. He presented a chart (p. 472) in evidence showing 98 business enterprises owned and. operated by Detroit hoodlums.
(The roster of the Detroit, Mafia organization follows:)
Key to legends at end of list.
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ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC. IN NARCOTICS 41
A. Interfamily relationships.
B. Criminal activity relationships.
C. Commercial and financial relationships.
D. Criminal activities.
1A. Currently in jail for narcotics trafficking.
1B. Awaiting trialon narcotics trafficking.
1C. Previous conviction for narcotics trafficking.
1D. Suspected of trafficking in narcotics.
2. Gambling.
3. Shylocking.
4. Labor racketeering.
5. Coin machine racketeering.
6. Extortion, mayhem, and murders.
7. Counterfeiting.
8. Receiving stolen goods.
9. Bootlegging.
10. Bribery.
11. Burglary, robbery, and larceny.
12. Tax evasion.
13. Aggravated assault.
14. Vice (prostitution).
15. Illegal possession of weapons.
16. Hijacking.
17. Contempt.
18. Obstruction of justice.
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42 ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
Law enforcement officials of several other major metropolitan areas testified that organized crime in the Cosa Nostra pattern is a serious and continuing malignancy in their cities. The subcommittee heard testimony concerning Tampa, Fla.; Buffalo, N.Y.; and the city of Boston, including nearby Rhode Island. It should be pointed out that Mafia activities are not limited to these cities alone, nor were they necessarily selected as top-ranking centers of organized crime. On the contrary, the top police officers of those cities appeared as witnesses in order to forward the subcommittee's avowed legislative purpose in holding the hearings.
Neil G. Brown, chief of police of Tampa, testified that the pattern of organized crime as he and his department knew it was characterized by "sophisticated and polished control" of rackets. He stated that it is the considered conclusion of his organization that the Mafia exists in Tampa, that it is the same group that had been previously described by Joseph Valachi, and that the Mafia controls most of the illegal gambling in Tampa and central Florida, and that its members have interstate and international ties to other Mafia groups. Chief Brown submitted a chart of the Tampa organization (exhibit No. 45, printed in the record facing p. 523, part 2 of the hearings), which was bluntly titled "The Mafia Organization in the Tampa, Fla. Area," and which gave the label of "Top Man" to Santo Trafficante, Jr., a hoodlum of national notoriety who is the known associate of many Cosa Nostra leaders, and who was a delegate to the Apalachin conference.
Mr. Brown repeated and emphasized the testimony of other police officials that one of the great problems in fighting organized crime is the difficulty of obtaining evidence sufficient to prosecute successfully the members of the Mafia, because witnesses live in fear of Mafia reprisals. Chief Brown declared that from 1928 to the present there have been 23 gangland slayings in the Tampa area and that only 1 of them has been solved - a murder which resulted from an argument and was not, therefore, typically a gangland slaying..
(The roster of the Mafia organization in Tampa. follows:)
Key to legends at end of list/
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ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 43
A. Interfamily relationships.
B. Criminal activity relationships.
C. Commercial and financial relationships.
D. Criminal activities.
1A. Currently in jail for narcotics trafficking.
1B. Awaiting trial on narcotics trafficking.
1C. Previous conviction for narcotics trafficking.
1D. Suspected of trafficing in narcotics.
2. Gambling.
3. Shylocking.
4. Labor Racketeering.
5. Coin machine racketeering.
6. Extortion, mayhem, and murders.
7. Counterfeiting.
8. Receiving stolen goods.
9. Bootlegging.
10. Bribery.
11. Burglary, robbery, and larceny.
12. Tax evasion.
13. Aggravated assault.
14. Vice (prostitution).
15. Illegal possession of weapons.
16. Hijacking.
17. Contempt.
18. Obstruction of justice.
Police officers from the State of Rhode Island and from the city of Boston testified to the organized crime pattern in that part of New England, agreeing that there are crime syndicates and that they are linked, and that the particular outfit that controls organized crime in Providence, RI., and in Boston, Mass., is headed by Raymond Patriarca, who was identified by Joseph Valachi as the Mafia boss in the Boston area. The chart showing the hoodlum organization headed by Patriarca is exhibit No. 53, printed in the record facing page 551, part 2 of the hearings.
Col. Walter E. Stone, superintendent of State police in Rhode Island, told the subcommittee that in his view syndicated crime is on
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44 ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
the increase across the Nation, and that the rate of increase is a menace to the country since law enforcement on State and local levels cannot effectively control organized crime. Both Colonel Stone and Police Commissioner Edmund L. McNamara of Boston agreed that organized crime thrives on public indifference and apathy. John T. Howland, deputy superintendent of Boston police, declared that Patriarca is the dominating influence in gambling, loan-sharking, and other criminal activities in Boston. Commissioner McNamara told the subcommittee that Joseph Valachi's testimony about the Cosa Nostra members whom he knew in Boston came as no complete surprise to the Boston police, since these were the same individuals that his department had under investigation as leaders of organized crime in Boston.
(The roster of the organized crime elements in Rhode Island and the Boston area follows:)
*Identified by Joseph Valachi.
Key to legends at end of list.
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ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 45
1A. Currently in jail for narcotics trafficking.
1B. Awaiting trial on narcotics trafficking
1C. Previous conviction for narcotics trafficking.
1D. Suspected of trafficking in narcotics.
2. Gambling.
3. Shylocking.
4. Labor racketeering.
5. Coin machine racketeering.
6. Extortion, mayhem, and murders.
7. Counterfeiting.
8. Receiving stolen goods.
9. Bootlegging.
10. Bribery.
11. Burglary, robbery, and larceny.
12. Tax evasion.
13. Aggravated assault.
14. Vice (prostitution).
15. Illegal possession of weapons.
16. Hijacking.
17. Contempt.
18. Obstruction of justice
Similar corroboration of Joseph Valachi's testimony came from police officials of Buffalo, N.Y., who verified his estimate of the number of Mafia members in the Buffalo and nearby Canadian areas. William H. Schneider, commissioner of police of Buffalo, N.Y., testified that the chart placed in evidence concerning the criminal organization in Buffalo accurately represents the structure of syndicated crime in that area, which includes nearby Canada and Youngstown, Ohio.
The officer in charge of the Criminal Intelligence Bureau of the Buffalo Police, Department, Lt. Michael A. Amico, testified at length about organized crime in his city:
A studied evaluation of all of the information compiled will lead to only one conclusion and that is that a criminal-type organization does exist in and around the city of Buffalo. Whether it is called the Cosa Nostra or by any other name it is manifestly apparent that it does exercise a certain degree of control over crimes such as gambling, vice, narcotics, labor racketeering, arson, and those of a similar vein (p. 585).
Mr. Amico testified further that he generally agreed with Mr. Valachi's estimate of approximately 100 to 125 members of the organization in the Buffalo area, and that he was completely in accord with Valachi's statement that Stefano Magaddino is the top man in organized crime in the Buffalo-Niagara Falls and Toronto areas. "Stefano is known to be the 'don' and in absolute control of all illegal operations
*Identified by Joseph Valachi.
44-253-65--4
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46 ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS
in the area as pertain to organized criminal activities," Lieutenant Amico stated. "No crime by members of the organization is permitted without his permission and guidance" (p. 589).
Lieutenant Amico was questioned particularly about Joseph Valachi's earlier testimony since the Buffalo branch of Cosa Nostra had figured prominently in Valachi's narrative.
Mr. Amico. * * * As a matter of fact, Senator, I was the one, with the help of my unit, to set up this chart, and surprisingly the hierarchy that I named were those individuals that Valachi was especially familiar with, that he indicated were those people in top echelons of crime. I had no outside help at this time and I was surprised to have that support or confirmation in effect, that Valachi mentioned here pub- liely (p. 586).
Lieutenant Amico said that Stefano Magaddino has extensive criminal interests and has great influence in syndicate decisions. The chart which shows the organization identified by Lieutenant Amico as the "Magaddino Empire of Organized Crime" is printed in the record facing page 580, Part 2.
An interesting sidelight to the subcommittee's current and previous investigations of organized crime was introduced by Lieutenant Amico, who confirmed Joseph Valachi's earlier statement that the late John C. Montana, of Buffalo, had been allowed to remove himself from the glare of publicity by virtual retirement from Cosa Nostra activities. Montana, who supposedly controlled the taxicab business in the City of Buffalo, attended the crime convention at Apalachin - even though he had once served on Buffalo's city council, was a prominent member or officer of many civic organizations, and had once been named Buffalo's "Man of the Year." Mr. Amico agreed with Joseph Valachi's identification of Montana as a former lieutenant to Magaddino and a man who at one time was very prominent in the Buffalo syndicate, but he added, "Since the Apalachin disclosure, however, Montana has seldom been seen in public with members of the criminal world" (p. 592).
Lieutenant Amico testified that the 21 crime leaders pictured on the Buffalo chart had together amassed a total of 355 arrests, an average of 17 per person. The lowest number of arrests for any individual was one and the highest was 49. Arrests averaged one per person for assault, robbery, grand larceny, burglary, and gambling. One of every three had been arrested for narcotics violations, one of every two for homicide, and one of four for extortion and for the possession of burglary tools.
Mr. Amico testified further (p. 607) that the Valachi testimony was of great value to the law enforcement process in affirming the relationships among the criminals and the structure of the organization. He added that if the Valachi testimony proved to be as accurate for other areas as he knew it had been for Buffalo, then it would be a certain aid in law enforcement.
Senator Javits spoke (p. 617) in commendation of the Buffalo police organization and of the value of the subcommittee's hearings at the end of the examination of organized crime in Buffalo. He stated that Lieutenant Amico's testimony summed up splendidly the
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ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS 47
relationships of these syndicates as well as the individual gangsters, one to another, showing a hierarchy of crime which should be a revelation to the American people.
(The roster of the Mafia organization in the Buffalo area follows:)
1A. Currently in jail for narcotics trafficking.
1B. Awaiting trial on narcotics trafficking.
1C. Previous conviction for narcotics trafficking.
1D. Suspected of trafficking in narcotics.
2. Gambling.
3. Shylocking.
4. Labor racketeering.
5. Coin machine racketeering.
6. Extortion, mayhem, and murders.
7. Counterfeiting.
8. Recelving stolen goods.
9. Bootlegging.
10. Bribery.
11. Burglary, robbery, and larceny.
12. Tax evasion.
13. Aggravated assault.
14. Vice (prostitution).
15. Illegal possession of weapons
16. Hijacking.
17. Contempt.
18. Obstruction of justice.
*Identified:by Joseph Valachi
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